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QUICK, BEFORE IT MELTS: TOWARD A RESOLUTION OF THE
JURISDICTIONAL MORASS IN ANTARCTICA

Even before its discovery, Antarctica was the subject of debate and
controversy.' After the existence of the once-hypothetical southern continent was established, the controversy shifted from the classroom to the
political arena. Anticipating a variety of benefits, one nation after another eagerly attempted to gain an Antarctic foothold. In the course of
this international ice rush, several nations staked sovereign claims to
areas which frequently overlapped. As a result, national rivalries were
aroused, and Antarctica became a hotbed of tension and mistrust.
Despite this atmosphere, the last two decades have witnessed the
emergence of the Antarctic as a fertile field for the growth of cooperative
scientific investigation at the international level. This development
began in the mid-1950's with the International Geophysical Year, 2
during which the various concerned nations agreed to set aside their
differences for the good of science. This cooperative regime has continued up to the present time under the terms of the Antarctic Treaty. In
addition to benefitting science,' this attempt to isolate Antarctica from
1. For a discussion of early theories postulating the existence of a southern continent,
see Gould, Antarctica in World Affairs, 128 FOR'N POLICY AsS'N HEADLINE SER. 11 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as Gould, Antarctica]. See also P. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, CONTROLS
FOR OUTER SPACE AND THE ANTARCTIC ANALOGY 139 (1959) [hereinafter cited as JESsuP &
TAUBENFELD].
2. The I.G.Y., which officially ran through 1957 and 1958, was an international effort
to foster scientific cooperation in a number of fields. The I.G.Y. program was directed by
a Special Committee of the International Council of Scientific Unions. Antarctic activity
figured prominently in the plans of the Special Committee, with Regional Conferences on
Antarctica taking place as early as 1955. Hayton, The Antarctic Settlement of 1959, 54

AM. J. INT'L L. 349, 353 n.18 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Hayton, Settlement]. For a more
detailed treatment of the I.G.Y. in Antarctica, see PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REPORT ON UNITED
STATES POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN ANTARCTICA,

H.R. Doc. No. 358, 88th

Cong., 2d Sess. 3-6 (1964).
3. Signed at Washington, December 1, 1959, [1961] 1 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780,

402 U.N.T.S. 71 [hereinafter cited as The Antarctic Treaty]. The Treaty entered into
force on June 23, 1961, after the deposit of instruments of ratification by all twelve
signatory nations. The original signatories were Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile,
France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Seven nations have since acceded to the Treaty. These
nations are Poland (1961), Czechoslovakia (1962), Denmark (1965), the Netherlands
(1967), Romania (1971), East Germany (1974), and Brazil (1974). C. BEEBY, THE ANTARCTIC TREATY 4 n.5 (1972) [hereinafter cited as BEEBY]; TREATIES IN FORCE (1976).

4. For an indication of the scientific advances being made in Antarctica, see Browne,
All the Polar World is Their Laboratory, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1974, at 2, col. 4.
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international tension demonstrates the viability of efforts to foster a
more far-reaching atmosphere of international harmony.
Notwithstanding this relaxation of international tension, as human
involvement in Antarctica increases, so must the human problems that
have traditionally plagued the course of frontier expansion. Recognizing
this fact, several nations have extended the reach of their criminal laws
to Antarctica. This Note examines these assertions of national jurisdiction' within the context of the still-smoldering dispute over territorial
sovereignty in Antarctica. Pointing out the frequently intimate relationship between sovereignty and the exercise of jurisdiction within a territory, the discussion suggests that the existing harmony could well be
disrupted by the enforcement of national legislation in Antarctica. It
concludes by proposing a new accommodation of national interests-an
accommodation more carefully calculated to preserve the future of Antarctic cooperation.
5. President Dwight D. Eisenhower referred to the Treaty as "unique and historic...
an inspiring example of what can be achieved by international cooperation in the
field of science and in the pursuit of peace." 106 CONG. REc. 2451 (1960). The Antarctic
Treaty was a pioneer agreement in a number of areas. It led the way in the move toward
limitation of nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste (Article V), codified
efforts to demilitarize the entire continent (Article I) and established a wide-open inspection system designed to insure that the provisions of the Treaty are followed (Article VIII).
For a detailed discussion of these and other provisions of the Treaty, see Hayton,
Settlement, supra note 2. See also F. AUBURN, THE Ross DEPENDENCY 35-44 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as AUBURN]. The treaty is still regarded as a forward-looking example
of international cooperation, although it is clear that the advanced form of international
administration which some had hoped for is not likely to come about in the foreseeable
future. Cf. id. at 36; Hayton, Settlement, supra note 2, at 367. It is often speculated that
the Antarctic experience could provide a useful model for the development of amicable
relations in outer space. See id. at 367. See generally JEssuP & TAUBENFELD, supra note 1.
For an interesting comparison with the Antarctic Treaty, see Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies, done at Washington, London and Moscow, January 27, 1967,
[19671 3 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
6. The term "jurisdiction" is used here to refer to the power behind the rule-making
aspect of the authoritative decision-making process ("legislative jurisdiction"). This Note
deals with problems surrounding the spatial reach of this legislative power. No attempt
is made to deal with concepts unique to the adjudicatory process, such as subject matter
and personal jurisdiction. Nor does this discussion consider related extradition problems.
It has been asserted that the "legislative jurisdiction" concept "suggests the drawing of
precise lines and a precise allocation of legislative competence among states." See H.
STEINER

& D.

VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS

the usage is misleading, and caution is in order.

892 (2d ed. 1976). To this extent,
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I
POLITICAL STATUS QUO: UNEASY ACCOMMODATION OF
CONFLICTING INTERESTS
To appreciate the complexity and practical importance of the jurisdictional problem, it is necessary to examine the uneasy political
balance that prevails in Antarctica. Those nations which have attained
Antarctic footholds have done so for a variety of reasons,7 often at the
expense of the claimed rights of other states. The degree of emphasis
with which each nation asserts its position varies considerably, but the
conflicting interests present a precarious foundation for the edifice of
Antarctic cooperation.
A.

TERRITORIAL CLAIMS IN ANTARCTICA

Seven nations have staked claims, which sometimes overlap, to areas
of Antarctica comprising about eighty per cent of the continent's surface.' The United States has refrained from either recognizing these
claims or asserting a claim of its own.' Nonetheless, extensive American
7. Among the reasons which have led nations to become involved in Antarctica, the
most important are Antarctica's potential as a source of natural resources and the continent's possible strategic significance. See Hearings On The Antarctic Treaty Before the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., at 5 (1960) [hereinafter cited
as Antarctic Treaty Hearings]; Gould, Antarctica, supra note 1, at 33. For a discussion
casting doubt upon the practical economic value of Antarctica's supposed mineral riches,
see Potter, Economic Potentialsof the Antarctic, 4 ANTARCTIC J. OF THE UNITED STATES 61
(1969). In addition to these pragmatic motives, all concerned nations appear to be acting
in a spirit of competition as a matter of national pride. See AUBURN, supra note 5, at 4.
8. The Antarctic claimants, together with the year in which each advanced its claim,
are the United Kingdom (1908), New Zealand (1923), France (1924), Australia (1933),
Norway (1939), Chile (1940), and Argentina (1942). In addition, South Africa has staked
an apparently unchallenged claim to certain sub-Antarctic islands. See JESSUP & TAUBENFELD, supra note 1, at 143-53. Before World War II, Japan and Germany each made vague
pretensions to Antarctic claims, but they have since ceased to press the point. Hayton,
Settlement, supra note 2, at 350-51 nn.6&7. The claims of Argentina, Chile, and the
United Kingdom overlap in the Palmer Peninsula region. For a map showing the location
of all Antarctic claims, see JESSUP & TAUBENFELD, supra note 1, fold-out at 144.
9. In 1924, Charles Evans Hughes, then Secretary of State, set forth the classic United
States position that the discovery of lands unknown to civilization, even when coupled
with a formal taking of possession, does not support a valid claim of sovereignty unless
the discovery is followed by an actual settlement of the discovered country. 11924] 2
FOREIGN REL. U.S. 519-20 (1939). For a discussion of the legal status of the "occupation"
standard upon which this position was based, see notes 25-44 infra and accompanying
text. The Hughes opinion goes on to state that the "impossibility" of "actual settlement"
in the polar regions renders polar claims invalid. Id. Although technological advances have
made "actual settlement" a problematic standard when applied to Antarctic activity, the
United States' position has bascially remained constant. See 2 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF
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activity in the Antarctic has created widespread appreciation of special
United States interests, including a sort of de facto recognition by other
concerned nations that the United States position is preeminent in the
major unclaimed portion of the continent.'" The Soviet Union follows a
nonrecognition policy similar to that of the United States" and has
established bases throughout the continent, often to the dismay of
claimants who feel that this violates their territorial integrity.2
The various conflicting viewpoints created a feeling of intense rivalry
which climaxed in the early 1950's when a long-standing dispute between the United Kingdom, Chile, and Argentina erupted in a brief
clash of arms.'3 Subsequently, the United Kingdom asked the InternaINTERNATIONAL LAW 1232-63 (1963). Despite this stance, the United States has expressly

reserved its right to make a territorial claim. See U.S. Invitation to Twelve Nation
Antarctic Conference, May 2, 1958, in PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REPORT ON UNITED STATES
POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN ANTARCTICA,

H.R. Doc. No. 358, 88th Cong., 2d

Sess., at 23 (1964).
10. The United States' special position in Marie Byrd Land dates from the explorations
of Admiral Richard E. Byrd during the late 1920's and 1930's. Gould, Antarctica, supra
note 1, at 26. For a discussion of the position of other nations with regard to United States
interests in Marie Byrd Land, see Hayton, Settlement, supra note 2, at 351 n.10, where
the author states:
It is no secret that states now claimants would be pleased if the United States
would claim this portion [of the continent], thereby at least tacitly recognizing
the validity of the sector principle and, by implication, supporting the other
claimants in their own sectors.
11. While the Soviets are relative newcomers to Antarctica, having become involved in
the continent only since the end of World War II, they point to early explorations by
Bellinghausen and Lazarev as the basis for special Soviet rights. See Orlov, Russian
Antarctic Discoveries of 1821 are Basis of Soviet Claim, 9 U.S.S.R. INFO. BULL. 296 (1949).
For an assertion of the Soviet position, see Statement of the U.S.S.R. Delegate to the
Antarctic Conference, in The Conference on Antarctica, Washington, October 15December 1, 1959, DEP'T STATE PUB. 7060, at 21-24, 52, 53 (1960). See also Toma, Soviet
Attitudes Towards the Acquisition of Territorial Sovereignty in the Antarctic, 50 AM. J.
INT'L L.

611 (1956).

12. Australia was particularly offended during the International Geophysical Year when
the Russians established bases in the "Australian sector." See L. GOULD, THE POLAR
REGIONS IN THEIR RELATION TO HUMAN AFFAIRS

21 (1958). This uneasiness stemmed largely

from Cold War hostilities which led many to question Soviet motives in the Antarctic.
See, e.g., Antarctic Treaty Hearings,supra note 7, at 11-13, 23-24.
13. From 1947 to 1955, the United Kingdom exchanged numerous protests with Argentina and Chile concerning their overlapping claims in the Palmer Peninsula region.
AUBURN, supra note 5, at 35. For a collection of some of these exchanges, see 5 POLAR
RECORD 228-40 (1948); 6 POLAR RECORD 413-18 (1952); 7 POLAR RECORD 212-26 (1954). In
1948 the intensity of this dispute prompted the three governments to agree to forgo sending
warships "south of latitude 60 degrees" unless those ships were carrying out "routine
movements such as have been customary for a number of years." 2 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

1238 (1963) (quoting a statement issued by the United Kingdom
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tional Court of Justice to resolve this sovereignty question. Argentina
and Chile insisted that their sovereignty over the disputed territory was
so clearly established that action before the I.C.J. would amount to
interference with a purely domestic matter.'4 In the face of this refusal
to recognize the Court's jurisdiction, the I.C.J. was forced to dismiss the
British application.'"
Since no international tribunal has ruled on the Antarctic sovereignty
dispute, and no judgment handed down in a different situation is clearly
in point, each concerned state has continued to interpret the relevant
principles of international law in accordance with its own interests. The
consequent lack of consensus has been accompanied by a solidification
of national intransigence on the issue.
1. Asserted Bases of Antarctic Claims
It has long been recognized that nations cannot acquire new territory
merely by expressing their desire to do so.'" Accordingly, those nations
that have staked Antarctic claims justify these assertions of sovereignty
by pointing to a variety of genuine connections which they have established with their claimed territory.'7 In doing so, these nations generally
rely upon some form of actual occupation, which they seek to bolster by
Foreign Office on January 18, 1949). The agreement has since been renewed annually.
Hayton, Settlement, supra note 2, at 352. Despite this precaution, on February 2, 1952,
the Argentine navy fired upon a British meteorological party which was attempting to
land at Hope Bay, within the disputed territory. The resulting British withdrawal was
only temporary, and the matter was settled through consultation at higher levels. Gould,
Antarctica, supra note 1, at 23. The exchange of diplomatic notes is reprinted at 6 POLAR
RECORD 413-18 (1952). Hostilities continued intermittently. In February of 1953, forces of
the United Kingdom destroyed buildings that had been erected in the Falkland Islands
by Argentina and Chile and expelled two Argentine nationals found at the scene. Hambro,
Some Notes on the Future of the Antarctic Treaty Collaboration,68 AM. J. INT'L L. 218
n.5 (1974).
14. See Antarctica Cases (United Kingdom v. Argentina, United Kingdom v. Chile),
[1956] I.C.J. PLEADINGS 89-96. See also JEssuP & TAUBENFELD, supra note 1, at 150. As
the United Kingdom was quick to point out, this argument seems to have ignored the fact
that Argentina and Chile have been unable to resolve a dispute between themselves
regarding sovereignty over the same territory. See Antarctica Cases, supra, at 98.
15. Antarctica Cases (United Kingdom v. Argentina, United Kingdom v. Chile), Orders
of March 16, 1956, [1956] I.C.J. REP. 12, 15. See Antarctica Cases (United Kingdom v.
Argentina, United Kingdom v. Chile), [1956] I.C.J. PLEADINGS 79.
16. See note 42 infra and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion dealing in part with some of the connections which the various
concerned nations have sought to establish with their Antarctic territory, see F. AUBURN,
THE Ross DEPENDENCY 15-30 (1972).
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claiming
that their occupation began with discovery of the claimed terri8
tory.
Early Antarctic discoveries were limited to a thin perimeter along the
coast. 9 Although parts of the interior have since been penetrated, modem forms of occupation are still concentrated, for the most part, in the
coastal regions."0 Indeed, much of Antarctica is so remote and inhospitable as to be practically inaccessible and certainly not subject to effective
control from coastal establishments. 21 In spite of this fact, each claiming
nation purports to extend the scope of its sovereignty far inland. This
extension has been justified through a convenient adaptation of the
continuity concept, which claiming nations broadly interpret as allowing the acquisition of vast untouched areas, so long as those regions are
contiguous to their coastal establishments.?
18. See Bernhardt, Sovereignty in Antarctica, 5 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 297, 318 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Bernhardt, Sovereignty]. Argentina and Chile take a different approach. These nations rely heavily upon their geographic proximity to their claimed territories, and also upon a supposed succession to "rights" received by Spain under the Papal
Bull of May 4, 1493. Even these two nations, however, recognize that occupation is a
crucial element in the acquisition of sovereignty. JEssu' & TAUBENFELD, supra note 1, at
145. Antarctic "occupation" consists, for the most part, of scientific bases and weather
stations. Token efforts toward administration, such as operation of postal facilities, have
also been undertaken by claimant states. See AUBURN, supra note 5, at 61; Gould,
Antarctica, supra note 1, at 20. For a discussion of the legal status of occupation and
discovery as bases for territorial claims, see note 25 infra and accompanying text.
19. A shroud of uncertainty surrounds the true story of the discovery of Antarctica. It
appears as though the continent may have been originally sighted in the early 1800's by
sealers who guarded their secret lest others share in the untapped bounty of Antarctic fur
seals. See Gould, Antarctica, supra note 1, at 12. By 1830, explorers from many nations
were sailing the Antarctic seas. The first notable historic claim to arise from these explorations was put forth by Dumont D'Urville in 1840, when he claimed the coast of presentday Ad~lie Land for France. Bernhardt, Sovereignty, supra note 18, at 317. It was not until
the early twentieth century, however, that claims based upon discovery were formally
asserted. Id. at 318. For a discussion of early Antarctic explorations in the context of their
relationship to territorial claims, see JESsUP & TAUBENFELD, supra note 1, at 139-59. See
also AUBURN, supra note 5, at 18-20.
20. A few early expeditions penetrated deep into the Antarctic hinterland. Roald
Amundsen, the Norwegian, reached the South Pole as early as 1911. Bernhardt,
Sovereignty, supra note 18, at 318. Some nations have established scattered bases far
inland. The Amundsen-Scott South Pole station, established during the I.G.Y. by the
United States, was one of the first inland bases. See Gould, Antarctica, supra note 1, at
37-42. See also JESsup & TAUBENFELD, supra note 1, fold-out at 144. The Soviets have
established a base near the geographic center of the continent. See N.Y. Times, June 13,
1973, at 2, col. 4.
21. Even some coastal terrain is nearly inaccessible. Until 1960, no landing had been
successfully attempted on the forbidding coast of Marie Byrd Land. Two United States
icebreakers finally accomplished the task, but only after laboring through nearly a thousand miles of ice-encrusted sea. Hayton, Settlement, supra note 2, at 351 n.10.
22. Generally, the continuity (or hinterland) concept is used to justify the inward exten-
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The Antarctic pie has consequently been cut into national sectors, the
boundaries of which reach to the South Pole.2 Those nations which
question the validity of the underlying claims quite naturally refuse to
observe these extended boundaries. Significantly, despite the fact that
the sector scheme resulted from a desire to reduce tensions among
claiming nations, the proper delineation of these boundaries is a point
of contention even among that group of states.24
2. Significance of "Occupation" to the Acquisition of Sovereignty
According to the traditional view, sovereignty over no man's land can
be acquired only through actual occupation of the claimed territory.2
This idea stems from the premise that the most efficient allocation of
sion of well-founded coastal claims "as far as is necessary for the integrity, security, and
defence of the land actually occupied." 1 L. OPPENHE1M, INTERNATIONAL LAW 512 (7th ed.
1948). For a discussion of the early application of this rationale, see G. SMEDAL, AcQuisITION

OF

SOVEREIGNTY

OVER

POLAR AREAs 43-44 (1931) [hereinafter cited as

SMEDAL].

Dur-

ing the African colonial era, the continuity concept emerged as a convenient device for
controlling colonial rivalries. The concerned nations divided the administration of
"unoccupied" African lands among themselves. This apportionment was only tangentially
related to "security," and it represented a blatant effort to reserve interior territory as a
"sphere of influence and interest" of the state which occupied the contiguous coastline.
See Bernhardt, Sovereignty, supra note 18, at 343-44. Cf. SMEDAL, supra at 44. Similar
concerns motivated the extension of claims in Antarctica. The division of Antarctic territory into sectors dates from the 1920's when the claims controversy began in earnest. It
was the result of early efforts to achieve a mutual recognition of claims designed to limit
the impact of emerging rivalries. BEEBY, supra note 3, at 5. It has been pointed out that,
far from giving rise to accepted principles of international law, these types of compromises
can at most bind the participating nations. See SMEDAL, supra at 44-45. Even if the
continuity concept were accepted as a general principle of international law, the Antarctic
situation is significantly different from other instances in which sovereignty has been
extended on this basis. Antarctic sector claims are based upon coastal claims which
themselvbs have an uncertain status under international law. See notes 25-44 infra and
accompanying text. For a general discussion of the various theories behind the so-called
sector principle, see SMEDAL, supra at 54. See also AUBURN, supra note 5, at 24-30; Bernhardt, Sovereignty, supra note 18, at 332-38.
23. See JEssuP & TAUBENFELD, supra note 1, fold-out at 144.
24. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
25. Discovery alone has been advanced in some quarters as sufficient basis for the
assertion of a valid territorial claim. AUBURN, supranote 5, at 18; Gould, Antarctica,supra
note 1, at 20. It appears, however, that the importance of discovery rights in international
law has diminished over the years. Id. For the United States position on the status of
discovery rights, see note 9 supra. International law generally requires that priority of
discovery be followed by "effective occupation" in order to confer sovereignty over previously unclaimed territory. Antarctic Treaty Hearings, supra note 7, at 52 (testimony of
Philip C. Jessup); Bilder, Control of Criminal Conduct in Antarctica,52 VA. L. REV. 231,
235 n.11 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Bilder, Criminal Conduct]. See also notes 30-34 infra
and accompanying text.
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territorial resources can be achieved only by placing those resources
at the disposition of the state in the best position to utilize themnecessarily the occupying state." Although it has been suggested that
the isolation and practical uninhabitability of polar regions makes it
impossible to acquire them through occupation, 21 the logic behind the
occupation requirement does not demand this result. If Antarctic resources are to be allocated at all, the continent's forbidding conditions
should diminish the degree of occupation necessary to support a territorial claim.2 Even so, unless some nation establishes a certain minimum degree of occupation in a previously unclaimed region, there is no
need-nor any reason-for that region to be subjected to the mastery of
28
any one nation.
The traditional view is that a nation must establish an effective level
of occupation in order to acquire sovereignty over a claimed territory.
As suggested by the increased acceptance of the allocation of resources
rationale, effectiveness has become a flexible-though still very
real-standard, the parameters of which are determined by the circumstances of each case." At one time, a nation could meet the effectiveness
standard only by taking exclusive physical possession of the claimed
region, but the emphasis has since been placed on the exercise of governmental functions over the claimed territory." While nations have seized
26. Bernhardt, Sovereignty, supra note 18, at 319. Vattel analyzed the role of the occupation doctrine along similar lines:
[Ilt is questioned whether a nation can, by the bare act of taking possession,
appropriate to itself countries which it does not really occupy, and thus engross a
much greater extent of territory than it is able to people or cultivate. It is not
difficult to determine that such a pretension would be an absolute infringement
of the natural rights of men, and repugnant to the views of nature, which, having
destined the whole earth to supply the wants of mankind in general, gives no
nation a right to appropriate to itself a country, except for the purpose of making
use of it, and not of hindering others from deriving advantage from it.
E. VA'rEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE 98-99 (J. Chitty
trans. 1883).

27. See W.

HALL,

A TREATISE ON

INTERNATIONAL LAW

125 n.1 (8th ed. 1924). The original

United States position on Antarctic sovereignty was founded upon this conception. See
note 9 supra.
28. Mfinch, V6lkerrechtsfragen der Antarktis, 7 ARCmV DES VOLKERRECHTS 225, 235
(1958). This seems to be consistent with the developing position of international law.
See JESSUP & TAUBENFELD, supra note 1, at 141. See notes 40-42 infra and accompanying
text.
29. See AUBURN, supra note 5, at 29; SMEDAL, supra note 22, at 37.
30. See Hayton, The "American"Antarctic,50 AM. J. INT'L L. 583, 599 (1958). See also
notes 33-44 infra and accompanying text.
31. The work of the African Conference, which opened at Berlin in 1884, reflected the
nineteenth century emphasis on physical possession. SMEDAL, supra note 22, at 18. The
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upon this relaxed standard in order to bolster broad Antarctic claims
through largely nominal measures, 1this reliance ignores recognized limits to the erosion of the effectiveness standard.
The award in The Island of Palmas Case33 recognized that the "actual
continuous and peaceful display of state functions is. . .the sound and
natural criterium of territorial sovereignty." 34 Although this decision did
not clearly describe the type of action required to meet this test, the
arbitrator relied primarily upon the Netherlands' manifestation of actual control over the disputed territory-including the exercise of
jurisdiction on the island. 3 5 The decision in The Clipperton Island
Arbitration3 reaffirmed the Palmasposition and provided that the mere
ceremonial proclamation of sovereignty has no effect. In Clipperton,the
arbitrator ruled that the claiming state can acquire sovereignty only by
placing itself in such a position that it is "capable of making its laws
respected" in the claimed territory." The Clipperton decision recognized that this overt form of occupation is not necessary when the region
is already "at the absolute and undisputed disposition" of the claiming
nation," but this exception can hardly be applied in the context of the
various Antarctic territories. 9 Therefore, the status of Antarctic claims
subsequent shift in emphasis has been described as the "natural consequence of the
recognition that in modem international law occupation is the acquisition of sovereignty
rather than of property." Waldock, Disputed Sovereignty in the Falkland Island
Dependencies, 25 Barr. Y.B. INT'L L. 311,317 (1948). This change in emphasis was marked
by the three cases discussed at notes 33-42 infra and accompanying text.
32. See AUBURN, supra note 5, at 10, where the author discusses the ramifications of the
"reduction" of the occupation standard to an "ill-defined minimum."
33. Island of Palmas Case (United States v. Netherlands), Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott)
83 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1932), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829 (1949).
34. Id. at 94, 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 840.
35. See id. at 122, 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 863. The arbitrator also emphasized the
Netherlands' demonstrated acquisition of commercial privilege in the claimed area as a
factor bolstering its assertion of sovereignty.
36. Clipperton Island Arbitration (France v. Mexico), 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390 (1932),
translating 6 REvuz GiNgRALE DU DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 129 (3d ser. 1932).
37. Id. at 394.
38. Id. See also Van der Heydte, Discovery, Symbolic Annexation and Virtual Effectiveness in International Law, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 448, 463 (1963), which points out that
an assertion of sovereignty need not always be accompanied by continual occupation of
"every nook and comer" of the claimed territory.
39. In Clipperton, the arbitrator upheld France's claim to the tiny island on the basis
of little more than discovery and symbolic annexation. Although France undertook no
actual settlement and did not attempt to take administrative measures, the arbitrator
applied the exception and stated that, in this case, "it is unnecessary to have recourse to
this method [of establishing sovereignty]." 26 AM. J. INT'L L. at 394. It has been pointed
out that:
In applying the Clippertoncriteria to Antarctica, the dangers inherent in applying
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hinges upon a determination of what action constitutes a display of state
functions sufficient to establish the claimant's capability of "making its
laws respected" in the claimed territory.
Since the Eastern Greenland Case,4" the clear trend has been toward
a lenient standard in this regard, at least when sparsely populated regions are concerned.4' Even so, there is no reason to suppose that this
leniency has eroded the effectiveness standard so extensively that it now
sanctions enormous claims to uncharted-indeed, unseen-lands, unless the claiming state exhibits more than the mere intent to possess
that territory.42 International law does not clearly define the extent of
activity necessary to provide a sound basis for a territorial claim, but it
does recognize that this manner of acquiring sovereignty involves a cu3
mulative process of establishing sufficient contacts to justify the claim.
open
is
legally
Until these contacts are established, the claimed territory
to all nations. There is no doubt that a considerable portion of the
formulae developed for a particular geographical entity (such as an island) to
another area (such as a continent) must be recognized. While Clipperton Island
is completely isolated and uninhabited, small and capable of effective territorial
occupation and administration in its entirety with only a few official representatives, the occupation of a continent is not amenable to so cavalier a treatment.
Bernhardt, Sovereignty, supra note 18, at 330.
40. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, [1933] P.C.I.J., ser A/B, No. 53.
41. In Eastern Greenland, the Permanent Court of International Justice stated:
It is impossible to read the records of the decisions in cases as to territorial
sovereignty without observing that in many cases the tribunal has been satisfied
with very little in the way of the actual exercise of sovereign rights, provided that
the other State could not make out a superior claim. This is particularly true in
the case of claims to sovereignty over areas in thinly populated or unsettled
countries.
Id. at 46. Smedal endorsed the Eastern Greenland approach, stating:
[Polar] regions are so sparsely peopled that orderly conditions can be maintained
by much more simple measures. ...
Nor will it be necessary in polar regions to make use of so great a civil administration as is required in densely peopled regions.
SMEDAL, supra note 22, at 34.
42. Although Eastern Greenland recognized a relaxed occupation standard, the Court
still maintained that "a claim to sovereignty . . . involves two elements each of which
must be shown to exist: the intention and will to act as sovereign, and some actual exercise
or display of such authority." [1933] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53, at 45-46. According to
Smedal:
[A] State wishing to occupy a polar territory must be required to establish a local
authority within the territory....
• . . If a polar land is to be occupied, it must. . . be required that the land is
controlled permanently and efficiently by the occupying State.
SMEDAL, supra note 22, at 34-35.
43. Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, [1953] I.C.J. 47, 104. See AuBuRN, supra note 5, at
12.
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Antarctic activities of the seven claiming states have been undertaken
with this thought in mind."
As a further response to this same concern, each Antarctic claimant
has passed legislation in which it purports to extend its criminal jurisdiction to Antarctica."5 The effect of this legislation, standing alone,
may be questionable, but its actual enforcement would be a significant
step toward establishing the claiming state's capability of "making its
laws respected" in the claimed territory. By satisfying the occupation
standard in this manner, the claiming state could build a strong case
for the validity of its claim to sovereignty. For this reason, nations
interested in preventing another state from perfecting its claim can be
expected to challenge any assertion of jurisdiction in Antarctica that is
based upon a claim of territorial sovereignty."
B.

ANTARCTIC TREATY: AGREEMENT NOT

To

AGREE

The Antarctic claimants overwhelmingly rejected initial proposals for
the relinquishment of claims and the internationalization of the continent." Increasing tensions and the penetration of Antarctica by the
Soviet Union soon aroused a greater awareness of the need to avoid
44. AUBURN, supra note 5, at 5. The heavy concentration of bases in the disputed Palmer
Peninsula region is the result of the conflicting political aspirations of Argentina, Chile,

and the United Kingdom. Hayton, Settlement, supra note 2, at 352. For an illustration of
this concentration, see JESsuP & TAUBENFELD, supra note 1, fold-out at 144.
45. See notes 60-61 infra and accompanying text. Cf. AUBURN, supra note 5, at 10.
46. See notes 55-59 infra and accompanying text. For a discussion of the relationship
between questions of sovereignty and jurisdictional disputes, see BE-Y, supra note 3, at
11.
47. The United States made the first concrete proposal for the internationalization of
Antarctica. See 19 DEP'T STATE BULL. 301 (1948). Subsequent discussions concentrated on
two alternative schemes: a multiple condominium over Antarctica (which would have
excluded the Soviet Union just as it was beginning its Antarctic involvement) and a
United Nations trusteeship over the continent. BEEBY, supra note 3, at 7 n.10. For a
discussion of these alternatives and the negotiation process which dealt with them, see
Hanessian, The Antarctic Treaty of 1959, 9 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 436, 437-44 (1960). See
also Hambro, Some Notes on the Future of the Antarctic Treaty Collaboration,68 AM. J.
INT'L L. 217, 224-25 (1974). New Zealand responded enthusiastically to the idea, but the
other six claimants could not be persuaded to agree. BEEFY, supra note 3, at 7-9. The
Soviet Union saw in this proposal a plot to prevent it from establishing a foothold in
Antarctica and protested to each concerned nation, stating that it could not recognize as
lawful any decision on the future of Antarctica that was reached without Soviet participation. 2 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1255-56 (1963). A period of diplomatic
stalemate ensued, although India did attempt to move things along by suggesting, in 1956,
that the United Nations discuss the question of an internationalized Antarctica. U.N.
Doc. A/3118/Add. 1, Sept. 13, 1956; U.N. Doc. A/3852, July 15, 1958 (with Explanatory
Memorandum). See Hanessian, Treaty, supra at 451-52.
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conflict. In addition, it became clear that the establishment of bases for
political reasons could only lead to wasteful duplication of effort, with
similar types of bases being concentrated in the most hotly disputed
territories. Furthermore, the success of the International Geophysical
Year in fostering international scientific collaboration created a widely
felt desire that some form of cooperative regime continue." At the same
time, old territorial concerns demanded a clarification-vis-a-vis the
occupation standard-of the legal significance of permanent Antarctic
bases established during the I.G.Y. program.49 These factors led to negotiations and the signing of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, which was designed to perpetuate the era of good feeling which had begun during the
course of the I.G.Y. operation."
In attempting to keep Antarctica free for peaceful scientific cooperation, the negotiating parties recognized that a general agreement providing for the surrender of sovereign claims was an unrealistic alternative.
Accordingly, they sought no final solution to the claims problem. Instead, the parties agreed to set the problem aside, at least temporarily,
by freezing existing positions, both as to claims and objections to
claims.5 ' The Treaty also declared a moratorium on new or expanded
assertions of sovereignty in Antarctica.2 This concept of holding sover48. The Soviet Union played a leading role in the I.G.Y. from its inception, and this
Cold War program enhanced political rivalries to a certain extent. Officially, however, the
I.G.Y. was a scientist-designed and scientist-directed program conducted "off the record"
with respect to territorial claims. Hayton, Settlement, supra note 2, at 353 n.18. Suggestions were made as early as 1957 that the close of the I.G.Y. should not bring with it the
end of scientific cooperation in Antarctica. Pending a more far-reaching agreement, 1958
saw the extension for one year of the "off the record" cooperative regime which had begun
with the I.G.Y. See Hanessian, Antartica: CurrentNationalInterests and Legal Realities,
1958 PROCEEDINGS AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 145.

49. Hayton, Settlement, supra note 2, at 353; see Auburn, supra note 5, at 35-36.
50. The Preamble of the Antarctic Treaty reflects this goal by recognizing "that it is in
the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively
for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord."
51. Article IV states:
1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as:
(a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or
claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica;
(b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of claim
to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of
its activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise;
(c) prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition
or non-recognition of any other State's right of or claim or basis of claim to
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.
52. Article IV also states:
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall
constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sover-
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eignty in abeyance was the most significant result of the Treaty negotiations. While its long-range effectiveness remains to be seen,5 3 it is clear
that no agreement could have been reached without this freezing proviof sovereign claims is essential
sion and that a continued reconcilation
5 4
to the future of Antarctic cooperation.
No such rapprochement was achieved on the closely associated problem of the exercise of jurisdiction. The parties did reach a limited accommodation which provides for the exclusive exercise of jurisdiction
over observers and exchanged personnel by the state of their nationality. 55 Attempts to reach agreement on the jurisdictional status of all
other persons foundered because of the fears of some nations that any
limitation on their jurisdictional power might hinder their efforts to
establish sound bases for their territorial claims.56 As a result, the Treaty
explicitly provides that the views of the parties on the jurisdiction question remain unprejudiced. 7 In view of their inability to agree on this
eignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new
claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica
shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force.
There is some dispute as to whether this provision prevents two or more parties from
jointly making a new claim. See Auburn, A Sometime World of Men: Legal Rights in the
Ross Dependency, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 578 (1971); Hanessian, The Antarctic Treaty of 1959,
9 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 436, 470 (1960)-(both of which maintain that Article IV does not
bar new joint claims)-and BEEBY, supra note 2, at 11 n.14 (taking the opposite view).
53. Auburn suggests that the Antarctic Treaty could easily lead to-and may already
constitute-a form of multiple condominium, whether or not such an arrangement is
expressly declared. AUBURN, supra note 5, at 14, 36, 82. He describes the condominium as
a compromise between states which disagree as to their sovereignty over a given territory
but are willing to leave the dispute unsettled. Id. at 81. The condominium concept has
been severely criticized. See JzssuP & TAuBENFELD, supra note 1, at 11-26. For a general
discussion of the condominium, see 1 G. HACKWOirTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 56-58
(1940).
54. The Antarctic Treaty provides for no specific termination date, but Article XII
establishes an unusual amendment mechanism which will permit dissatisfied parties to
undermine the Treaty regime as soon as 30 years have passed from its inception. See
BF sy, supra note 3, at 16-17; Hayton, Settlement, supra note 2, at 364-65. For an interesting, if unconvincing, interpretation which contends that the Treaty provides for withdrawal before the expiration of this 30-year period, see Bernhardt, Sovereignty, supranote
18, at 310-12. A party could, of course, undermine the Treaty arrangement of any moment
by withdrawing its cooperation.
55. Antarctic Treaty, art. VIII (1).
56. BEEBY, supra note 3, at 11-12. Some nations were reportedly prepared to swallow
this fear at the Antarctic Conference and support a provision establishing exclusive jurisdiction by each state over its own nationals. See id. at 11; Bilder, CriminalConduct, supra
note 25, at 238 n.21.
57. Antarctic Treaty, art. VIII(l). This provision creates an ambiguity in Article IV(2),
which provides that "[n]o acts. . .taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall
constitute a basis for. . .supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarc-
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point, the parties provided that in the event of actual dispute they will
"consult together with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable solution.""8
This gap in the Treaty could be a major source of disruption." The
hope that a solution can be achieved on a case-by-case basis is probably
unrealistic, considering the important role which the exercise of jurisdiction plays in the perfection of sovereignty. Unless the parties specifically
eliminate this problem, it will continue to pose a threat of reawakening
the presently dormant sovereignty dispute, thus threatening the future
of international cooperation in Antarctica.
II
JURISDICTION IN ANTARCTICA: ESTABLISHED GUIDELINES
AND CURRENT PRACTICE
Each of the seven Antarctic claimants has either specifically enacted
legislation governing criminal conduct in Antarctica"0 or considers its
tica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica." A strict interpretation of this
language suggests that the exercise of jurisdiction should have no impact on the position
of any nation with respect to sovereignty; yet the parties were not able to deal specifically
with this delicate point. More significantly, there is no indication that Article IV(2) has
led the Antarctic claimants to relax their efforts to satisfy the occupation standard. See
AUBURN, supra note 5, at 5, 37-38. See also Argentina's Capital:A PolarIsland, N.Y.
Times, August 11, 1976, at 7, col. 2 (reporting an excursion to Antarctica by high officials
of Argentina's government, seemingly to "reaffirm" Argentine sovereignty). This continued maneuvering seems to be motivated by the realization that the end of the Treaty
regime will undoubtedly be accompanied by a renewed scramble to assert sovereign
claims. There is considerable force to the argument that Article IV(2) does not eliminate
the significance of completely executed acts which continue in effect beyond the duration
of the Treaty. See Bernhardt, Sovereignty, supra note 18, at 313. This argument seems
to contemplate acts such as the establishment of permanent bases, but it is submitted
that the argument applies equally to the establishment of a nation's capability of "making
its laws respected" in the claimed territory. A nation could accomplish this goal by
consistently exercising its jurisdiction within a given territory.
58. Antarctic Treaty, art. VIII(2). In addition, the Treaty provides that meetings shall
be held "at suitable intervals and places" for the purpose of considering "measures in
furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Treaty." Article IX(1). Among the
matters suggested for consideration are "questions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction
in Antarctica." Article IX(1)(e). Despite this suggestion, the jurisdictional question has
yet to be considered. See BEBY, supra note 3, at 17.
59. BEERY, supra note 3, at 17. Beeby identifies two other problems. The first is the
possibility that a non-party to the Treaty could enter Antarctica and refuse to abide by
the rules. The second involves the exploitation of any economic resources which may be
found on the continent. Id. at 17-18.
60. Australia: Act No. 42 of 1954, Australian Antarctic Territory Act 1954, reprinted
in 7 POLAR RECORD 425 (1955); Act No. 48 of 1960, Antarctic Treaty Act 1960, reprinted
in 11 POLAR RECORD 302 (1962).
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domestic criminal legislation to be applicable in its claimed territories.6 '
In addition, nonclaimant South Africa has expressly provided that its
domestic legislation applies to criminal conduct by South Africans in
Antarctica.2 Many nations have seen no need to directly confront the
question, but a number of these countries are in a position similar to
that of South Africa, since they generally apply at least some of their
laws to extraterritorial conduct by their own nationals throughout the
63
world.
While the theories underlying the various assertions of jurisdiction
vary, all concerned nations agree that control of criminal conduct is
essential to the continued orderly development of operations in Antarctica.64 Nevertheless, due to the potential impact of national legislation
Chile: Act of June 17, 1955, Congresso Nacional Ley No. 11,846, Statute of the Chilean
Antarctic Territory, 78 Diaro Oficial 1321 (June 21, 1955); July 17, 1956, Decreto Supremo
No. 298, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 70 Diaro Oficial 1922-23 (Oct. 3, 1956).
New Zealand: Act No. 47 of 1960, Antarctica Act 1960, reprinted in 11 POLAR RECORD
303 (1962).
Norway: Law of Feb. 27, 1930, No. 3, Norge Lover 1682-1963 & 1247-48, as amended,
Law of June 2, 1964, No. 17, Norge Lover 1847-48 (1964).
United Kingdom: British Antarctic Territory Order in Council, 1962, No. 400, and
British Antarctic Treaty Order in Council, 1962, No. 401, reprinted in 11 POLAR RECORD
306-13 (1962). The Falkland Island Application of Enactments Ordinance, 1954, as
amended by the Application of Enactments (Amendment) Regulations 1963 makes certain United Kingdom criminal laws applicable to the British Antarctic Territory.
61. Argentina: Law of Feb. 28, 1957, Boletin Oficial (March 19, 1957), reprinted in 9
POLAR RECORD 52 (1958).
France: Law of Aug. 6, 1955, [1955] J.O. 7979, cited in Hanessian, NationalActivities

andInterests in Antarctica-PartII: The ClaimantNations, 2 AMERICAN UNIV.
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REPS., Polar area ser., No. 6 (1962).

62. South African Citizens in Antarctica Act, Act No. 55 of 1962, promulgated by
Government Notice No. 826 in 4 Gazette Extraordinary, No. 249 (May 25, 1962). The text
is reprinted in 11 POLAR RECORD 313 (1962).
63. See, e.g., GERAN PENAL CODE § 3; GREEK CODE OF PENAL PROCEDURE § 3; INDIAN
PENAL CODE § 4; JAPANESE PENAL CODE art. 3. See also FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL LEGISLATION FOR THE U.S.S.R. AND THE UNION REPUBLICS art. 5, 2d Session of the Supreme Soviet
of the U.S.S.R., 5th Convocation (Dec. 1958).
64. It is important to note, however, that, despite extensive American activity in Antarctica, the United States does not appear to have provided for the prosecution of cases
involving Antarctic transgressions by American civilians. Similarly, it is highly doubtful
that conduct by a foreign national at a United States base in Antarctica could be the
subject of prosecution in American courts. For an excellent discussion of this apparent gap
in American legislation and the implications of that gap, see Bilder, Criminal Conduct,
supra note 25. Auburn suggests that if an American should commit a crime in Antarctica,
the courts of the United States would nevertheless be forced "to make some assertion of
jurisdiction." AUBURN, supra note 5, at 81. This view is bolstered by the outcome in United
States v. Escamilla, 467 F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 1972). In that case, an American was accused
of murdering another American on Fletcher's Ice Island in the Arctic Ocean. Although
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upon the Antarctic sovereignty dispute, at least some of these nations
have an interest in preventing other nations from actually enforcing
their legislation. This dilemma has obvious implications for the future
of Antarctic cooperation. This situation demands an examination of
traditional jurisdiction theory and an appraisal of its adequacy as a
guideline in the special context of Antarctica.

A.

TRADmONAL GUIDELINES

It is well recognized that a nation cannot regulate conduct in a particular set of circumstances unless that nation has some legitimate interest
in the outcome. Courts and scholars have devised a number of theories
to define the type of connection that a nation must have in order to
legitimately exercise its jurisdiction. 5 Certain principles have emerged,
but nations have differed in their application of these guidelines to
specific situations. As a result, customary international law is extremely
flexible on this point, and few set limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction can be discerned. Scholars have stated that "neither international
law nor common-sense judgment" requires a mechanical application of
established principles to justify a particular assertion of jurisdiction. 6
there was considerable doubt whether American legislation covered this type of situation,

an equally divided Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's exercise of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case. In doing so, the court avoided a possible conflict with
Canadian interests by declining to expressly state its reasons for finding a jurisdictional
basis. For contrasting views of the result in Escamilla,see Auburn, InternationalLaw and
Sea-Ice Jurisdictionin the Arctic Ocean, 22 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 552 (1973) (disagreeing
with the result); Note, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Arctic Ice Islands: United States v.
Escamilla, 4 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. Rxv. 419 (1975) (contending the court acted upon a
proper jurisdictional basis).
65. The leading effort to formulate international guidelines for the proper exercise of
legislative jurisdiction is the Harvard Research in InternationalLaw, Jurisdictionwith
Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J. INT'L L. SuPP. 435 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Harvard
Research], which suggests a Draft Conventionon JurisdictionWith Respect to Crime, id.
at 439-42. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT], adopts a framework similar to that of
the HarvardResearch. For examples of other scholarly efforts in this field, see 2 TREATISE
ON INTERNATIONAL CIMUNAL LAW (M. Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973); Sarkar, The Proper
Law of Crime in InternationalLaw, 11 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 446 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as Sarkar, ProperLaw]. For a similar choice of law analysis, see Leflar, Conflict of Laws:
Choice of Law in Criminal Cases, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 44 (1975).
66. Bilder, Criminal Conduct, supra note 25, at 274; see H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 881 (2d ed. 1976). The opinion of the Permanent Court of
International Justice in the Case of the S.S. "Lotus" suggests that a particular exercise
of jurisdiction need not be affirmatively justified by reference to some established jurisdictional rubric. Instead, the burden is upon a complaining party to demonstrate a restrictive
principle which is violated by the assertion of jurisdiction. The court stated:
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Nevertheless, three suggested jurisdictional principles provide a particularly useful framework for analysis of the problem in Antarctica. 7
1.

TerritorialPrinciple

The universally recognized theory of territorial jurisdiction allows a
state to legislate with respect to conduct occurring within its territory."8
Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not
extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons,
property and acts outside their territory, [international law] leaves them in this
respect a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by
prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the
principles which it regards as best and most suitable.
[1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 19. Sarkar deplores this flexibility, complaining that it
gives "plausibility in international law to extravagant new claims to territorial jurisdiction." Sarkar, ProperLaw, supra note 65, at 466.
67. Two other frequently discussed jurisdictional principles could justify legislation
with respect to certain activities in Antarctica, although these principles have little application to the present analysis. The protective principle allows a state to assert jurisdiction
over an alien who has committed extraterritorial acts which threaten the security or
integrity of that state. Sarkar, Proper Law, supra note 65, at 462. The theoretical basis
for this principle is the right of self-defense, but its practical justification is found in the
inadequacy of national legislation to punish territorial conduct directed against the vital
interests of foreign states. Harvard Research, supra note 65, at 552. According to the
Harvard Research, the protective principle is "claimed by most States, regarded with
misgivings in a few, and generally ranked as the basis of an auxiliary competence." Id. at
445. For a concise discussion of the protective principle, its limits, and its increasing
acceptance in modern international practice, see Note, ExtraterritorialJurisdictionand
JurisdictionFollowing ForcibleAbduction: A New IsraeliPrecedentin InternationalLaw,
72 MICH. L. REV. 1087, 1092-97 (1974). The universalityprincipleprovides that jurisdiction
may be asserted, regardless of nationality or place of crime, merely on the basis of custody.
This principle is recognized only in the case of crimes that affect the international community or violate international law. See Feller, JurisdictionOver Offenses With a Foreign

Element, in 2 TREATISE

ON INTERNATIONAL CmiNAL LAW

5, 32-34 (M. Bassiouni & V.

Nanda eds. 1973). Universal jurisdiction over piracy has long been recognized. See Harvard Research, supra note 65, at 445. War crimes now have a similar status. Garcia-Mora,
Crimes Against Peace in InternationalLaw: From Ntarnbergto the Present, 53 Ky. L.J.
35, 36-46 (1964). For a discussion of other crimes that have occasionally been suggested
as justifiably triggering the universality principle, see Note, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction,
supra at 1097-1100.
68. Harvard Research, supra note 65, at 480. The territorial principle is founded upon
the two tenets of territorial sovereignty and the equality of nations. 1 L. OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 262 (8th ed. 1955). Chief Justice Marshall described the interrelationship of these tenets:
The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory, is necessarily exclusive and
absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction
upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of
its sovereignty to the extent of its restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty, to the same extent, in that power, which could impose such restriction.
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This principle has been extended to permit a state to exercise jurisdiction over an act that originates outside its borders, provided that act has
substantial direct effects within the territory of the asserting nation."g
The territorial principle is the primary basis upon which each Antarctic claimant purports to extend its jurisdiction to Antarctica. Instead of
limiting the scope of its jurisdiction to acts committed by its own nationals (or any other similarly limited group), each claimant applies its
laws to all conduct within its claimed territory. France and Argentina
have not even felt the need to enact special legislation extending their
laws to Antarctica-apparently because those nations look on their
Antarctic sectors as mere extensions of 7metropolitan
territory, and thus
0
automatically subject to domestic law.
2. Nationality Principle
The nationality (or active personality) theory allows a state to regulate the conduct of its own nationals, regardless of where that conduct
takes place.7 Although all nations recognize this principle, they often
Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). The acceptance of this
principle has an important element of practicality, for it is clear that "[tihe territorial
sovereign has the strongest interest, the greatest facilities, and the most powerful instruments for repressing crimes, whether committed by native-born subjects, or by domiciled
aliens, in [its] territory." G. LEwIs, FOREIGN JURISDICTION AND THE EXTRADITION OF
CRIMINALS 30 (1859), quoted in Harvard Research, supra note 65, at 483.
69. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, at § 18. This extension is often described as the
theory of "objective territoriality." See Harvard Research, supra note 65, at 487-88. For a
discussion of American and British cases that support this extension, see id. at 488-91.
For a more recent discussion, see Bassiouni, Theories of Jurisdictionand Their Application in ExtraditionLaw and Practice, 5 CAMF. W. INT'L L.J. 1, 11-19 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Bassiouni, Jurisdiction].See also Sarkar, Proper Law, supra note 65, at 452-56.
The "law of the flag" concept is a further extension of the territorial principle. This
concept adopts the fiction of "floating territoriality," thereby allowing nations to exercise
jurisdiction over acts committed aboard vessels entitled to fly the flag of the asserting
state. See Bassiouni, Jurisdiction,supra at 19-34. For a statement of this concept couched
in terms of the nationality principle, see Convention on the High Seas, done at Geneva,
April 29, 1958 [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, art. 5. In the
Case of the S.S. "Lotus," supra note 66, the Permanent Court of International Justice
dealt with a collision on the high seas in which acts committed aboard a French ship
produced unintended effects on a Turkish vessel. In finding that Turkey could properly
exercise jurisdiction over the responsible Frenchman, the court assimilated the Turkish
vessel to Turkish territory. This result effectively recognized the propriety of both extensions of the territoriality principle-the theory of "objective territoriality" and the "law
of the flag" concept. See BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONs 308 (1955).
70. For a concise discussion of the relevant legislation, see Bilder, Criminal Conduct,
supra note 25, at 260-63.
71. Harvard Research, supra note 65, at 519. This theory stems from the idea that all
persons owe a duty of allegiance to the state of their nationality. Id.; Sarkar, ProperLaw,
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differ substantially as to the manner and extent of its application.7 2
The nationality principle has been utilized to justify the regulation of
73
activity in Antarctica. This is true not only of nonclaiming states,
which necessarily cannot assert jurisdiction on the basis of territoriality, but of some claiming states as well. For instance, in addition to
asserting jurisdiction within their claimed areas, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom purport to regulate activity of their own
nationals throughout the Antarctic continent.74
3.

Passive PersonalityPrinciple

The passive personality theory gives a state legislative jurisdiction
over offenses committed against the person or property of its nationals,
regardless of the nationality of the perpetrator and the location where
the wrong took place. 5 A few countries support this principle," but it
has been expressly repudiated by others and has been severely criticized
by scholars.7 7 In addition, the decision of the Permanent Court of Intersupra note 65, at 456-57. For a critical appraisal of the nationality principle, see id. at
456-62. See also American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347,356 (1909), where
Holmes suggests that the application of the nationality principle to an offense committed
abroad can be regarded as "an interference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which the other State concerned justly might resent."
72. For example, while some nations apply their laws to minor extraterritorial crimes
committed by their nationals, others do so only in the case of the most heinous offenses.
See Sarkar, Proper Law, supra note 65, at 457-58. For a thorough discussion of these
differences, see Harvard Research, supra note 65, at 519-39. See also Bassiouni,
Jurisdiction,supra note 69, at 41.
73. See notes 62-63 supra and accompanying text.
74. See Bilder, Criminal Conduct, supra note 25, at 261.
75. The passive personality theory is based upon the premise that the state's ultimate
welfare depends upon the welfare of its nationals. The argument is that the state has a
legitimate interest in asserting jurisdiction over those who threaten that welfare. Bassiouni, Jurisdiction,supra note 69, at 44.
76. For a comment on an Israeli statute based upon this principle, see Note,
ExtraterritorialJurisdiction,supra note 67.
77. The Anglo-American countries have vigorously opposed the passive personality
principle. Harvard Research, supra note 65, at 579. Some maritime conventions have
expressly prohibited contracting parties from relying on this theory to assert jurisdiction.
See International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Penal Jurisdiction in Matters of Collisions and Other Incidents of Navigation, signed at Brussels,
May 10, 1952, 439 U.N.T.S. 233; Convention on the High Seas, supranote 69, art. 11(1).
Both the Restatement, supra note 65, at § 30(2), and Harvard Research, supra note 65,
at 579, reject the passive personality principle. Harvard Research concludes that this
theory invites needless controversy, especially since its desirable objectives are adequately
served by other principles. Id. For the classic American position, see Moore, Report on
Extraterritorial Crime and the Cutting Case, FOREIGN REL. U.S. 757 (1887), strongly
attacking the passive personality principle.
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national Justice in the Case of the S.S. "Lotus""8 casts strong doubt
upon the validity of the passive personality principle, other than as a
mere auxiliary basis of jurisdiction." It appears that no nation has attempted to extend the reach of its laws to Antarctica on the basis of
this principle.

B.

INADEQUACY OF TRADITIONAL GUIDELINES IN THE CONTEXT OF
ANTARCTICA

While established jurisdictional principles provide a useful framework
for analyzing the jurisdictional problem that has arisen in Antarctica,
they should not divert attention from considerations peculiar to that
problem. Traditional guidelines for the exercise of jurisdiction developed from actual international practice in circumstances unlike the
unique situation that prevails in Antarctica. It should not be assumed
that the extreme flexibility of these guidelines is appropriate in the
context of Antarctica. If the era of Antarctic cooperation is to continue,
the concerned nations must consider these guidelines in light of the
delicate balance of national sensitivities that prevails on the continent.
The flexibility of customary jurisdictional guidelines inevitably leads
to situations where more than one nation has a legitimate basis for
applying its law. While no definite standards dictate which nation
should yield in such a situation, the common practice is to defer to the
jurisdiction of the nation that has a territorial basis for asserting its
jurisdiction." This informal system has been effective in avoiding con78. [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10.
79. The court did not expressly reject the passive personality principle, which was the
basis for Turkey's prosecution of a French naval officer. However, in the process of finding
other justifiable grounds for Turkey's exercise of jurisdiction, the court hinted that there
is little foundation for the passive personality concept as a proper jurisdictional basis. A
number of judges indicated strong disapproval of the theory. See Bilder, Criminal Conduct, supra note 25, at 273 n.129.
80. This deference is commonly expressed in national legislation, which tends to confirm the view that other principles merely provide jurisdictional bases subsidiary to the
territorial jurisdiction of the state in which the crime was committed. See Harvard Re.
search,supra note 65, at 531. See also Auburn, InternationalLaw and Sea-Ice Jurisdiction
in the Arctic Ocean, 22 INT'L & CoM. L.Q. 552, 556 (1973), arguing that the American
exercise of jurisdiction in United States v. Escamilla,supra note 64, if based upon nationality, represented a denial of sovereign Canadian claims. It appears, however, that international law leaves each nation free to determine this matter for itself. HarvardResearch,
supra note 65, at 531. See Sarkar, ProperLaw, supra note 65, at 459, noting the "grave
potential dangers" inherent in a system which allows more than one nation to concurrently
assert jurisdiction in a particular case. See also 2 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw 226-27 (1941). In United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 158 (1933), the Supreme Court
stated: "There is not entire agreement among nations or the writers on international law
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flict, even though many nations regard the exercise of jurisdiction as a
basic element of their sovereignty and are therefore reluctant to relinquish jurisdiction.'
If a case of competing jurisdiction should arise in Antarctica, this
reluctance would undoubtedly be magnified. No nation would be likely
to relinquish jurisdiction in favor of the asserted territorial jurisdiction
of a nation whose claim it does not recognize." This reluctance would
be enhanced by the fear that the other nation's exercise of jurisdiction
could be a significant step toward perfecting its claim., The situation
would be particularly troublesome if each nation were asserting jurisdiction on the basis of territoriality-a situation that could easily arise in
the disputed Palmer Peninsula region. 8 The traditional practice of deferring to the territorial sovereign would obviously be of no help. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the concerned nations would be willing to
simply defer to the initial asserter. This solution would be contrary to
the interest that each nation has in refusing to recognize the other's
jurisdiction-an interest that could even lead one state to exercise jurisdiction despite a prior prosecution by the rival claimant. 5 In addition
to subjecting the particular offender to double jeopardy, this sort of
conflict would pose a clear threat to the future of Antarctic cooperation.
Unless the future of Antarctic cooperation is to rest upon the hope
that the frozen continent will remain free from crime, it is apparent that
a new accommodation of interests is necessary. Due to the continual
increase of human activity in Antarctica, this problem becomes more
pressing with the passage of time.
as to which sovereignty should yield to the other when jurisdiction is asserted by both."
This situation seems to be governed by principles of public policy and international
comity. See United States v. Reagan, 453 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied 406 U.S.
946 (1972).
81. See Sarkar, Proper Law, supra note 65, at 469.
82. This would be true even if the conflict involved a nonclaiming state, such as the
United States or the Soviet Union. It is possible that in this type of case the territorial
claimant would be willing to relinquish jurisdiction, since to do so would involve no
recognition of a competing claim. See generally Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100,
124 (1923), emphasizing that considerations of public policy may well lead the territorial
sovereign to "forego the exertion of its jurisdiction or to exert the same in only a limited
way." However, such a waiver would be unlikely, particularly on the part of the United
Kingdom, Chile, or Argentina, each of which must worry about even indirectly impairing
its position with regard to the overlapping claims of those nations.
83. See notes 45-56 supra and accompanying text.
84. For a discussion of the dispute over sovereignty in the Palmer Peninsula, see notes
13-15 supra and accompanying text.
85. For a discussion of the double jeopardy problems that have arisen in similar situations, see Sarkar, Proper Law, supra note 65, passim. For a disbussion of traditional
safeguards, see HarvardResearch, supra note 65, at 602-16.
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TOWARD A RESOLUTION
Nations concerned with developments in Antarctica hold certain fundamental interests in common. Each nation has a stake in preventing
the proliferation of uncontrolled criminal conduct. At the same time,
the unique Antarctic experience requires that jurisdiction over such
conduct be exercised in a manner calculated to avoid international
conflicts that could disrupt the prevailing cooperative regime. The goal
of a new approach must be to mold inadequate (indeed, nearly nonexistent) international guidelines into a jurisdictional scheme that will
promote commonly held interests without offending conflicting national
positions on the sovereignty question. The conclusion is inescapable
that, in order to preserve harmony, territoriality must be rejected as a
basis for the assertion of jurisdiction in Antarctica. It is equally clear
that this rejection should not be allowed to impair the status of national
claims-however questionable those claims may be considered by other
nations.
A.

PROPOSED JURISDICTIONAL SCHEME: EMPHASIZING NATIONALITY
RATHER THAN SOVEREIGNTY

Several nations may have interests that are sufficient to justify their
application of national law to a particular set of circumstances. If emphasis is removed from the place where the act occurred, the exercise
of jurisdiction must depend upon a connection between the asserting
state and a concerned individual-either the perpetrator or the victim. 8
Since nationality generally provides the most definite and uniformly
understood connection between a state and an individual, the new Antarctic formula should focus upon an application of either the nationality
or passive personality principle (both of which emphasize this connection), or upon a combination of these principles.
The nationality principle, which finds a proper jurisdictional basis in
the nationality of the perpetrator, has received far greater acceptance
than the passive personality principle, which emphasizes the nationality
of the victim."7 At first blush, this fact alone would seem to dictate that
a new Antarctic scheme be based upon an exclusive application of the
86. In addition, a nation would be justified in exercising jurisdiction over certain activities, regardless of the place where they occur or the nationality of the individuals involved,
if they threatened the asserting nation's vital interests or those of the international community. See note 67 supra.
87. See notes 71-72 & 75-79 supra and accompanying text.
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nationality principle. By totally eliminating the territoriality issue, this
measure would significantly reduce the potential for jurisdictional conflict. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that such a scheme would fully meet
the needs of the situation.
The primary goal of any jurisdictional system must be to assure that
wrongdoers are brought to justice. The flexibility of current international practice attempts to achieve this goal by allowing almost any
interested nation to apply its laws to a particular case. If one of these
nations should fail to exercise its jurisdiction, it is likely that another
interested state will deal with the situation. This inherent gap-filling
mechanism could not operate in Antarctica if the new formula were to
vest exclusive jurisdiction in the state whose national committed the
act. Even more significantly, an exclusive nationality scheme would
provide no recourse against a stateless Antarctic wrongdoer. Consequently, the new Antarctic accommodation must replace the flexibility
of international practice by supplementing the nationality scheme with
a specific gap-filling procedure.
As a first step, the concerned nations should explicitly recognize the
passive personality principle as a subsidiary basis for the application of
national laws to Antarctic activity. Since this principle has not been
widely accepted, it is necessary to examine objections to its invocation
in the context of its proposed implementation as a gap-filling mechanism in Antarctica.
According to traditional wisdom, the territorially interested state and
the state whose national has gone astray both have a greater interest in
controlling criminal conduct than has a state whose only connection
with the case is an injury to one of its nationals. Consequently, an
assertion of jurisdiction solely on the basis of the victim's nationality,
can be viewed as an interference with the sovereignty of those states.
Since the wrongdoer is likely to be prosecuted in any event, such an
assertion can only invite needless controversy with nations who feel that
their sovereignty has been slighted. 8
An objection based on this line of reasoning would have little force in
the context of the new Antarctic formula. In the absence of a territorially
interested state, even those who support the traditional position would
agree that the state whose national has been injured has an interest
second only to that of the state whose national committed the wrong.
Undoubtedly, cases must arise in which the national state of the accused
fails to carry out the prosecution or is unable to do so because it has not
extended its laws to cover activity of its nationals in Antarctica. In a
88. See Harvard Research, supra note 65, at 579.
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case such as this, or in one involving a stateless defendant, the injured
party's state would have the primary interest in bringing the wrongdoer
to justice. 9 Under these circumstances, an exercise of jurisdiction by the
passive personality state would satisfy the need to fill jurisdictional gaps
without infringing the sovereignty of other nations.
This scheme leaves a further jurisdictional gap which would be troublesome if a case should arise in which the nations of all concerned
individuals have failed to extend their laws to cover Antarctic activity
or in which only stateless persons are involved. Such a case may be
uncommon, but the possibility is sufficiently clear to require that a
further gap-filling mechanism be included in the new scheme. The best
solution would be to recognize the right of any Treaty party to assert
jurisdiction in such a case. Although the community interest in preventing the proliferation of crime provides an unusual justification for the
application of national law, the occasion for the invocation of this mechanism would be so rare that it is unlikely to raise any objection on the
part of other nations-especially since the alternative would be to allow
the offender to go unpunished.'
The foregoing jurisdictional scheme should be adopted through an
amendment to Article VIII of the Antarctic Treaty. 2 The following language is suggested as a model. 3
89. Harvard Research uses a substantially identical rationale to justify assertions of
jurisdiction in similar situations. Although it uses this rationale in the context of the
universality principle, the accompanying discussion indicates that it borrowed the justification from past discussions and applications of the passive personality principle. See
HarvardResearch, supra note 65, at 589-91. The same discussion touches on the question
of whether justice is served when a person is subjected to the laws of a nation with which
he may have had no prior contact and, therefore, no reason to be aware of that nation's
position on the value judgments inherent in any legal system. This should present no
problem for the proposed scheme, so long as the act for which the defendant is to be
prosecuted caused a genuine injury to the national of another state. In the case of acts or
omissions that cannot truly be described as mala in se, it is possible that ignorance of law
would be a good defense. See id. at 590.
90. The proposed scheme adopts a heirarchy in which the passive personality state is
entitled to exercise jurisdiction only when the state of the wrongdoer's nationality has
failed to do so. A scheme in which each of these nations is granted concurrent jurisdiction
might be equally viable, with jurisdictional conflicts being settled through international
comity. Nevertheless, the need to avoid potential disputes in Antarctica indicates that the
heirarchical arrangement would be the safer course.
91. This notion is not entirely novel. Harvard Research, in its discussion of the universality principle, advocates a similar jurisdictional basis. See HarvardResearch, supranote
65, at 591-92.
92. For a discussion of the present provisions of Article VIII, see notes 55-58 supra and
accompanying text.
93. A scheme that allocates jurisdiction in terms of absolute principles is open to the
objection that jurisdiction thus defined may be abused. Potential problems may arise in
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ARTICLE VIII
In the case of acts or omissions that occur in Antarctica during the
course of this Treaty regime, no person shall be subjected to the jurisdiction of any State, other than:
1. the State or States of which he is a national; or
2. a State whose national has been injured by the act or omission in
question, provided the State or States referred to in paragraph 1 of this
Article have refused prosecution or have otherwise failed to assert jurisdiction; or
3. any Contracting Party, provided no other State is entitled to assert
jurisdiction by virtue of paragraph 1 or 2 of this Article or all States
referred to in those paragraphs have either refused prosecution or otherwise failed to assert jurisdiction.

B.

STATUS Quo STILL FROZEN

Since all nations attach tremendous importance to the exercise of
territorial jurisdiction, it may prove difficult to convince nations cling-

ing to Antarctic claims to adopt a scheme that discards the jurisdictional significance of sovereignty. This is particularly true since, notwithstanding their expressed desire to freeze the status of sovereign

claims, those nations seem to treat the exercise of territorial jurisdiction
as a potentially important aspect of their efforts to perfect their terri-

torial claims.94 Nevertheless, those nations have little choice but to
adopt the proposed scheme if they truly wish to assure the continued

viability of the cooperative regime in Antarctica. This course would be
more acceptable to claiming states if it were clearly understood that, by

refusing to exercise jurisdiction on a territorial basis, they will not be
relinquishing their claims to sovereignty.

Although territorial jurisdiction is one of the traditional trappings of
territorial sovereignty, it is axiomatic that the two are not inseparable.

It is not uncommon for a nation to surrender a portion of its jurisdictional authority, even within its own borders, when to do so furthers
national interests.95 It would be difficult to argue that this practice
a number of respects, among them: the manner in which custody is acquired, the type of
treatment to which the accused is subjected, the fairness of judicial proceedings, and the
possibility of double jeopardy. For a discussion of generally accepted safeguards, see
HarvardResearch, supra note 65, at 596-632.
94. This problem proved to be an insurmountable obstacle during the original Treaty
negotiations. See notes 55-56 supra and accompanying text.
95. For example, most nations are allowed to exercise jurisdiction-over members of their
armed forces, regardless of their location. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, at § 31(b);
Bassiouni, Jurisdiction, supra note 69, at 11 n.26. For a discussion of this practice of
surrendering jurisdictional authority, see id. at 7-11.
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impairs the relinquishing state's sovereignty-especially when the surrender is clearly temporary and is freely entered into by the relinquishing state. Moreover, the parties to the Antarctic Treaty have already
agreed that actions taken during the Treaty regime "shall not constitute
a basis for. . .denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. . . ."" The adoption of a new jurisdictional scheme would seem
to be precisely the sort of action that this language was designed to
cover.97
Consequently, there is no reason to suppose that the proposed scheme
will threaten the delicately balanced status quo. On the contrary, by
defusing a potentially explosive issue, the proposed scheme will contribute to the perpetuation of the cooperative regime in Antarctica.
CONCLUSION
The Antarctic model for international cooperation is founded upon a
delicately balanced understanding of the legal status of territorial
claims in Antarctica. Until now, each concerned nation has been satisfied that its position is protected with regard to the recognition or nonrecognition of claims. The implementation of national criminal laws in
claimed areas-a privilege inherent in sovereignty-threatens to upset
the balance. If the era of Antarctic good feeling is to continue, it is
imperative that the concerned nations forge a new jurisdictional accommodation. This accommodation must remove territoriality as a basis for
the exercise of jurisdiction and focus upon the nationality of the individuals involved in each case. If jurisdiction is to be vested in the states
whose nationals are involved, it must be understood that the new accommodation prejudices the position of no nation with regard to the
dispute over sovereignty in Antarctica.
Eric W. Johnson
96. Antarctic Treaty, art. IV(2).
97. It has been suggested that the provision containing this language would not erase
the legal significance of completely executed acts which continue in effect beyond the
duration of the Treaty. See Bernhardt, Sovereignty, supra note 18, at 313. Although this
interpretation carries a great deal of force, there is no reason to assume that it would apply
to the temporary relinquishment of territorial jurisdiction. If the amendment implementing the new scheme were to include language clearly indicating that the relinquishment
of territoriality shall continue only for the duration of the Treaty regime, any possibility
of running afoul of this interpretation would be elimipated.

